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FEATURE

ARTICLE

Are The Antitrust Agencies
Overregulating
Physician Networks?
by Clark C. Havighurst

When the antitrust laws were first seri- -entail some agreement concerning the price and
ously applied to the medical profession follow- other terms on which otherwise independent
ing the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in competitors sell their services. Unless such a
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,' a principal ob- venture qualifies as a sham rather than as a lejective of antitrust enforcers was to contest or- gitimate effort to reduce marketing and other
ganized medicine's control of health care financ- transaction costs, however, it is not an appropriing. In the ensuing years, most health care mar- ate candidate for condemnation under the venerkets evolved under antitrust protection so that able principle that price fixing is illegal per se.2
they now feature a variety of financing entities Nonetheless, current antitrust enforcement policy
that are not only independent of professional appears to give too little credence to the possicontrol but also highly aggressive in forcing phy- bility that a physician network controlled by physicians to sell their services on competitive terms. sicians might yield marketing efficiencies that
Although competition has not yet come to every more than offset any loss of competition among
local market, concerted action by physicians is the joint venturers themselves. In one of nine
no longer an ubiquitous obstacle to its emergence. joint statements of enforcement policy regardIndeed, in mature markets for medical services, ing antitrust issues arising in the health care field,
antitrust enforcers may do more harm than good the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the
if they continue to view concerted action by phy- Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") have specisicians with the skepticism that was appropriate fied certain conditions that any network joint
venture must meet before they will view it as
in earlier years.
3
Antitrust enforcers today are too quick anything other than a per se violation. These
to presume anticompetitive results
when physicians organize so-called
Mr Havi ghurstis a William Neal Reynolds ProfessorofLaw
network joint ventures for the purat Duke University. The author is grateful to Charles D.
pose of contracting with competWeller of the Ohio barfor calling his attention to the probing health plans or with employers
lem addnessed in this article,for other insights,and, in parpurchasing health services for their
ticularfo
employees. As a species of joint
r pointingout the extent to which current antitrust
policy iginores the special needs and circumstancesof selfselling agency, a physician network
insured employers as purchasers ofphysician services.
joint venture certainly deserves
close antitrust scrutiny since it may
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conditions are too restrictive and should, for both
doctrinal and policy reasons, be relaxed.
To say that the current policy of the DOJ
and the FTC toward physician networks is
overregulatory is not to say that Congress or the
enforcement agencies should accede to demands
by organized medicine that ordinary antitrust
principles be bent to accommodate physician
collaboration. The problem is not a problem with
antitrust law, instead the agencies have simply
made a doctrinal error, adopting a rule of thumb
when they should have applied the rule of reason. Regrettably, this error gives added ammunition to organized medicine in its continuing
battle for legislative relief from antitrust strictures; relief that would inevitably shelter more
than just procompetitive activity by professional
groups.4 By the same token, giving collaborating physicians a chance to demonstrate that their
joint venture poses no ultimate threat to competition, despite its failure to pass the agencies'
objective test, would weaken the policy argument
for softening antitrust rules applicable to physician collaboration.' Moreover, it would do so
without sacrificing antitrust principles or authorizing anticompetitive conduct. Most importantly, it would remove an impediment that currently forces innovation in the delivery of medical services into narrow channels, with adverse
consequences for the range of consumer choice
and possibly also for the quality of care provided.
Origins of current enforcement policy
concerning physician collaboration
The successful antitrust campaign against
physician control of the financing and delivery
of health services in the 1970s and 1980s was
one of the great victories in the history of anti-
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trust law. Beginning in the 1930s, the medical
profession created a panoply of Blue Shield and
other profession-controlled health care financing plans that enabled physician interests to dictate the economic conditions of medical practice. To be sure, independent financing programs
also existed in the marketplace. But these plans
were subject both to legal restrictions imposed
at the behest of professional interests and to the
threat of coercive boycotts by professional
groups, and consequently also played by the
profession's preferred rules.6 In addition, even
after Blue Shield and similar plans were freed
from direct professional control, many of them
protected their dominant market positions by
serving local providers as their principal marketing agent. In return for marketing provider
services on noncompetitive terms, a dominant
Blue plan could count on providers collectively
to deny competing plans discounts of the kind
the Blues themselves typically enjoyed, to resist
incursions by alternative financing and delivery
systems, and to stonewall efforts by commercial
insurers to introduce competition by selectively
contracting with providers.7
However, the health care marketplace
began to show signs of competitive life in the
1970s as alternative financing and delivery
mechanisms began to get a foothold. In selfdefense, physician groups in many local markets
organized a second generation of profession-controlled entities. So-called foundations for medical care ("FMCs") and individual practice associations ("IPAs") served the profession well for
a while as effective defenses against both independent health maintenance organizations
("HMOs") and innovative purchasing practices
by conventional health insurers. In the Maricopa
County Medical Society case,8 for example,
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FMCs in two Arizona counties established maxi- ring in American health care today." Indeed,
mum prices for physician services and performed without uncompromising antitrust enforcement
utilization review for health insurers that agreed against physicians, the nation would have had to
to pay physicians under their fee schedules. The wait much longer for private innovations that
apparent purposes of the Arizona doctors in cre- make providers effectively accountable to conating the FMCs were to collectively set a limit- sumers for the cost as well as the quality of medientry price for their services (thus making the cal care.2 More likely, without antitrust enforcemarket less attractive to independent HMOs) and ment clearing the way for private innovation,
to induce health insurers not to embark on inde- government would have assumed a dominant role
pendent paths in procuring physician services on in financing and regulating health care, as it has
competitive terms. More recently, dominant phy- in other countries.
To be sure, the
sician interests have
danger
of physician
sought to use preof
the
medical
success
The
collaboration to supferred-provider orgapress competitive
nizations ("PPOs")
the
in
controlling
profession
developments in loor other network
cal markets has not
joint ventures to economic environment of
disappeared, and
maintain solidarity in
to
the
1930s
from
physicians
continuing antitrust
the face of purchasvigilance is still warers' new efforts to
the
...
was
arguably
the
1980s
ranted. Neverthethe
break
less, there are many
profession's ranks. most successful restraint of
markets in which
Antitrust enforcers
by
trade
ever
perpetrated
doctors can no
have been approprilonger reasonably
ately alert to these
against
interests
private
9
hope to forestall uncollective efforts.
wanted developThe success American consumers.
ments by banding
of the medical profession in controlling the economic environment together. Too many large purchasers now have
of physicians from the 1930s to the 1980s (par- the incentives, the tools, the bargaining power,
ticularly in delaying the emergence of corporate and the independence they need to prevent docmiddlemen able and willing to act as purchasing tors from exercising market power. This includes
agents for consumers in procuring physician ser- Blue Cross and Blue Shield, whose plans were
vices on competitive terms) was arguably the finally forced by competition to use their market
most successful restraint of trade ever perpetrated strength on behalf of consumers rather than proby private interests against American consum- viders 3 , commercial health insurers, and large
ers.' 0 By the same token, the antitrust battles self-insured employers. Selective contracting
that hastened the breakup of medical cartels and discounting of physician fees in return for
paved the way for the revolution that is occur- assured patient load are now common practices.
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In addition, integrated health care systems, com- guishable on its face from anticompetitive arbining in various ways the functions of financ- rangements appropriately condemned in the past.
ing and delivery, are being constructed by many
The joint DOJ/FTC enforcement policy
players and are now significant factors in most states that physician network joint ventures "will
local markets. Although there remain some be reviewed under a rule of reason analysis and
places where the doctors' old strategies may still not viewed as per se illegal either if the physibe capable of heading off unwanted change, the cians in the joint venture sharesubstantialfinanmarket forces that have been unleashed in most cial risk or if the combining of the physicians
communities cannot easily be reversed by into a joint venture enables them to offer a new
counter-revolutionary professional action. In product producing substantial efficiencies."
most circumstances, antitrust enforcers should These requirements are not laid down merely as
no longer presume that physician collaboration conditions that must be met to qualify for a sothat is not certifiably innocuous is intended to called "safety zone" in which private parties are
restrain trade rather than to achieve efficiencies promised freedom from government attack. To
or to offer purchasers a fuller range of health care be sure, the guideline does delineate two "safety
options. Suspicions that were well justified when zones;" one for exclusive networks, which are
physicians possessed the means of controlling the sole marketing agents for participating phytheir economic environment are not generally sicians, and one for nonexclusive networks,
justified today.
which do not preclude their members from marketing themselves through other networks as
well. In each case, the cited conditions, plus a
Networks under today's enforcement
policy and the rule of reason
market share screen relating to the percentage of
physicians engaged, must be met to satisfy the
Although the health care industry is un- agencies. The guideline goes
on to state (in the
dergoing a remarkable transformation, the one quoted language), however,
that networks not
group of players that might develop the most efmeeting these requirements, while not necessarficient systems for delivering high-quality perily unlawful, can satisfy the rule of reason only
sonal health care at reasonable cost are some- if the two stated conditions are
met. Although
what constrained in doing so by the way antithe context of the guideline suggests that the
trust law is currently applied to their endeavors.
drafters had in mind only networks that fail the
Specifically, physicians organizing joint ventures market share
tests (20 percent for exclusive netfor the purpose of marketing themselves to maworks and 30 percent for nonexclusive ones), the
jor purchasers are being forced by unrealistic
guideline is written in such a way that the two
antitrust standards into arrangements that may conditions
apply even to very small joint venserve consumers less well than arrangements that
tures. Moreover, a footnote underscores that the
such standards foreclose. The problem lies prinrule of reason will apply only if "the joint vencipally in the insistence by the antitrust enforce- ture is not
likely merely to restrict competition
ment agencies that any physician-controlled netand decrease output, such as, for example, an
work have objective features that make it distinagreement among physicians who do not share
1995-1996
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substantial financial risk that fixes the price that
each physician will charge." Subsequent statements and applications of the guideline by agency
personnel confirm that even very small joint ventures are expected either to impose financial risks
on participating physicians or to integrate their
practices so thoroughly as to yield "a new prod14

uct.'

Thus, current enforcement policy declares specific conditions that must be met if any
physician network joint venture is to avoid being classified as a violation per se, making it conclusively indefensible by reference to conditions
in the marketplace, to efficiencies it might
achieve, or to other procompetitive features or
consequences of the undertaking. To be sure,
the policy statement is only a guide to the prosecutors' policy and not a regulatory rule, and one
might wonder whether or not enforcement policy
is as restrictive in fact as it seems to be on paper.
Nevertheless, because antitrust counselors report
that the agencies are taking their policy statement at face value, collaborating physicians must
be advised that, to avoid a risk of litigation, they
must comply with the agencies' dictates until
enforcement policy is modified in some authoritative way.
The guidelines put the government on
record as conclusively deeming any physician
network joint venture of any size to be unlawful
unless it is demonstrably something more than a
joint selling agency wholesaling the services of
the doctors in the group. A group of physicians
would thus be absolutely barred from appointing an agent to negotiate on their behalf with sophisticated purchasers, such as insurers, employers, and other prepaid health plans, if the agent,
rather than the individual physicians, had authority to set prices. Yet the practical difficulties that
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individual physicians face in finding secure
places in the world of managed care are such that
efficiencies in the form of saved transaction costs,
not the elimination of competition, may easily
be their principal objective in organizing such a
sales agency. Purchasers, too, may realize significant cost savings from arrangements that
spare them from having to bargain with numerous physicians individually. A proper application of the rule of reason would allow a physician network a chance to show that
procompetitive effects predominate, whether or
not the physicians "share substantial financial
risk" or "offer a new product." Although many
proposed arrangements would fail a rule of reason test, some joint ventures representing significant subsets of practitioners and not satisfying the guideline requirements might be found
in particular circumstances to have more positive than negative effects.
As a doctrinal matter, only certifiably
"naked" restraints of trade, those having no object other than suppression of competition, are
or should be subject to per se rules. To be sure,
the Supreme Court's opinion in the Maricopa
case seemed to say that per se rules may be applied to certain kinds of conduct even though
there may be some question concerning the nakedness of the restraint.I5 But the Court's method
in that case demonstrated the excessiveness of
its rhetoric justifying the arbitrary use of per se
rules. A careful reading of the majority opinion
by Justice Stevens reveals that he actually applied the rule of reason and took what has come
to be called a "quick look" at all the circumstances before finding unsupportable the FMCs'
claim that their fixing of maximum prices was
procompetitive; specifically, that it made costs
more predictable for both insurers and insureds,
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thereby lowering the cost and improving the quality of health insurance coverage. Indeed, Justice Stevens showed notable insight in his appraisal of the challenged practice. For example,
he observed that, to achieve the efficiencies
claimed, "it is not necessary that the doctors do
the price-fixing."' 6 He thus focused on the availability of a less restrictive, more procompetitive
way in which better insurance coverage could
be provided - namely, by having an insurer itself set the fee schedule and contract with those
physicians who were willing to abide by it. Since
such selective contracting with physicians was
practically unheard of at the time and was precisely what the doctors hoped to discourage, his
prescience was particularly commendable. 7
Thus, despite what Justice Stevens said
in Maricopa about having no choice but to apply a per se rule to maximum price fixing, the
Court did not in fact find a violation until after it
had discredited the physicians' claim that their
maximum fee schedules were procompetitive.
Thus, Justice Stevens stated that "the record in
this case is not inconsistent with the presumption that the respondents' agreements will not
significantly enhance competition."' 8 Such consulting of the record to see whether a presumption of illegality might be successfully rebutted
demonstrates that the presumption was not conclusive; as a per se rule would be. Likewise, the
Court said, "It is entirely possible that the potential or actual power of the foundations to dictate
the terms of such insurance plans may more than
offset the theoretical efficiencies upon which the
respondents' defense rests.' 9 Obviously, the
question whether market power offsets efficiencies would not come up if the Court were truly
bent on applying a per se rule. Although the
Maricopaopinion is certainly confusing to any-
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one who follows Justice Stevens's rhetoric rather
than his footwork, the Court's ruling was in no
way inconsistent with the generally respected
principle that only naked restraints of trade and,
apparently, not all of them2 are appropriate candidates for per se treatment.2'
In any event, despite the tendency of antitrust lawyers to dichotomize between "per se"
and "rule of reason" cases; per se rules are not at
war with the rule of reason, but are instead products of its application to particular facts.22 Such
rules should therefore never be applied without
first applying the rule of reason. Applying a
lawyerly factual analysis ensures that the case
does indeed call for invoking the policy inherent
in past rulings condemning comparable practices
as indefensible restraints. The antitrust agencies,
however, are apparently unwilling to look at the
whole picture in judging physician network joint
ventures. Indeed, if the guidelines are taken literally, a joint venture representing, on a
nonexclusive basis, no more than a-modest proportion (say, ten percent) of community physicians in each specialty would be condemned as
a per se violation. Physicians are thus barred by
the threat of antitrust attack from forming joint
selling agencies that do not meet government
specifications. Although antitrust prosecutors are
not chartered to wield prescriptive powers, they
have in this instance, by publicly committing
themselves to exercise their prosecutorial discretion in a particular way, become de facto regulators.23
There is no mystery about the source in
case law of the agencies' insistence that physician-controlled networks, to escape antitrust challenge, must either impose financial risks on the
joint venturers or integrate the doctors' practices
so substantially as to "offer a new product." In
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the Maricopacase, the Supreme Court rejected appropriate requirements in defining safe harbors
the FMCs' claim that they were engaged in price for certain physician collaborations. But they
fixing "only in a 'literal sense"' by stating that should not be made mandatory in all joint ven"their combination in the form of the foundation tures by denying noncomplying ones a hearing
does not permit them to sell any different prod- under the rule of reason even when the parties
uct."'24 The Court went on to distinguish the make a plausible claim that their purpose is
FMCs from "joint arrangements in which per- procompetitive and that their agreement on prices
sons who would otherwise be competitors pool is ancillary to that purpose. In fact, absence of
the features specified by the agencies does not
their capital and share the risks of loss ...
unerringly identify a naked restraint deserving
The Court concluded its analysis as follows:
automatic condemnation without proof of the
parties' anticompetitive purpose, of their power
If a clinic offered complete
to affect competition in the market at a whole
medical coverage for a flat fee,
(not merely interse), or of the actual or probable
the cooperating doctors would
effect of their arrangement. Thus, a correct analyhave the type of partnership arsis of a physician-sponsored network falling outa
price-fixwhich
in
rangement
side the guidelines' safety zones would walk sening agreement among the doctors
sitively through the elements of purpose, power,
But
would be perfectly proper.
and effect, condemning it only if there is a probthe fee arrangements disclosed by
able net harm to competition or if the parties have
the record in this case are among
employed unreasonable means to achieve their
independent competing entreprelegitimate objectives. Such an analysis of phyneurs. They fit squarely within
sician network joint ventures, which could often
the horizontal price-fixing
26
be completed with only a "quick look," might
mold.
sometimes result in a clean bill of health rather
The agencies' position is thus seemingly sup- than a decision to prosecute.
ported by clear dicta in a Supreme Court opinion (for a four-Justice majority), and might eas- Physician networks as joint selling
ily carry the day in another court even though agencies
Maricopainvolved a market very different from
Physician network joint ventures are best
most of those one finds today. But the agencies'
viewed for antitrust purposes not as naked rejob is not to prosecute every case they might win
straints of trade, but as joint selling agencies
on the basis of questionable dicta or precedent.
("JSAs"), a type of arrangement that has not genInstead, it is to employ their expertise and facterally been condemned as a per se violation.27
finding capability to prevent true restraints harmIn a passage quoted with approval by the Suful to competition and consumer welfare while
preme Court in the NCAA case, Professor Philip
encouraging arrangements that create efficienAreeda has observed that "joint buying or sellcies.
'28
ing arrangements are not unlawful per se."
Certainly, risk sharing and integration are
84 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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Likewise, Professor Lawrence Sullivan has
opined that:

restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except sti3
fling of competition."'9
Despite the favorable treatment of joint
[S]ome joint arrangements to
selling arrangements in BMI, however, that case
buy or sell will not be summarily
is the ultimate source of much of the reasoning
held to be unlawful ...because
in the Maricopacase that apparently led the DOJ
summary analysis does not sugand FTC to insist that physician-controlled networks must either force the doctors to share figest a degree of market power
which clearly demands that intenancial risk or enable them to "offer a new prodgration benefits be forbidden beuct." To be sure, the Court praised the
cause price competition will be
procompetitiveness of the performing-rights soreduced. Joint agency cases such
cieties in making it easier, in a complex market,
as these must be analyzed under
for composers to market their music and for usthe rule of reason, fully blown.
ers to hire it. But the Court's overall analysis,
If the proposed selling or
by emphasizing that the arrangement involved
buying agency would materially
more than joint selling alone, may appear to jusincrease concentration and if as a
tify hostility to less integrated physician joint
result the balance of forces would
ventures. Thus, the Court stressed that the socishift significantly away from rieties each offered users of copyrighted music a
valry and toward accord, the arparticularly convenient form of blanket license,
rangement should be rejected as
which it characterized as "to some extent, a difunreasonable. Just as surely, if
ferent product. '32 Moreover, it went on to say
competition could be expected to
that "to the extent that the blanket license is a
continue unabated, or even to
different product, [a performing-rights society]
improve, the rule of reason will
is not really a joint selling agency offering the
mandate that the market's mangoods of many sellers,"33 thus implying that a
ner of striving for efficiency not
mere JSA would not qualify for rule of reason
29
off.
choked
treatment. The Maricopa Court cited this disbe
cussion in rejecting the FMCs' claim that they,
The Supreme Court cited Professor Sullivan's too, were engaged in price fixing "only in a litobservations with approval in BroadcastMusic, eral sense."'
Inc. v. CBS,' overturning a decision condemnIt is a mistake in judging physician neting per se, as price fixers, two performing-rights works, however, for the enforcement agencies
societies that jointly marketed musical compo- to focus so minutely on these two cases and on
sitions on behalf of their composer-members. others blurring the line between naked and anThe Court held that the composers, through the cillary restraints 3 rather than consulting general
societies, were engaged in price fixing only "in antitrust principles, under which per se rules apa literal sense" and that their pooling of compo- ply only to certain categories of the former. In
sitions for licensing purposes was "not a 'naked BMI, the Court needed to find very strong
1995-1996
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procompetitive features in the arrangements because the societies, between them, dominated the
licensing of musical compositions and were
highly vulnerable to condemnation in the absence
of a strong business justification.36 Thus, if all
the facts are considered, a physician network representing only a fraction of the physicians in an
area, especially on a nonexclusive basis, might
be able to make as persuasive a case for joint
marketing as the BMI defendants. Certainly the
efficiencies they could point to (based on the high
transaction costs that both physicians and bulk
purchasers would face in creating relationships
by individual negotiation and in administering
those relationships) would be similar in kind, and
probably in magnitude, to the efficiencies
achieved by performing-rights societies.
Moreover, a significant fact noted by the
Court as favoring application of the rule of reason in the BMI case was the retention by the composers of the right to license their respective compositions on an individual basis.37 As a practical
matter, however, that alternative method of marketing was highly inefficient. It also did little to
offset the market power of the societies, especially since the composers were not free to license their works through competing agents.38
Nonexclusive physician networks, on the other
hand, would permit physicians not only to service individual patients on a fee-for-service basis but also to join other networks, thus posing
much less of a threat to competition. Such
nonexclusivity should, in fact, save any network,
whatever its size, that exists in a market where
large employers and other payers have, and exercise, real opportunities either to organize their
own networks or to patronize other existing physician groups. Of course, the enforcement agencies might reasonably require network physicians
86 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

to show that they are participating in competing
ventures in fact, not merely that they are free to
do so on paper. In addition, sponsorship of the
venture by a local medical society, rather than
by a subset of competing physicians, should defeat any claim that it is a procompetitive, rather
than a defensive, undertaking.
There is no good reason in antitrust doctrine or policy why the antitrust agencies should
not, in proper cases, be willing to treat physician-sponsored networks as JSAs and their attendant limitations on price competition as ancillary restraints subject to the usual test of reasonableness. Under the appropriate analysis, the
authorities would give due recognition to the
severe practical difficulties that physicians in solo
or small group practices face in marketing their
services to numerous large buyers. Lacking appreciable business experience and the staff resources necessary to negotiate and to keep track
of their relationships with multiple payers, physicians should be free, within normal limits imposed by antitrust law, to form and operate JSAs.
In mature markets for medical care, purchasers
are generally capable of looking out for themselves and should be free to do business with
physician networks that do not follow the current prescriptions of the antitrust authorities. In
such markets, physicians are more likely to form
JSAs as vehicles for competing on a price-discounted basis for particular contracts than as
cartelizing devices.
Less restrictive alternatives?
The evaluation of ancillary restraints of
trade does not end with their classification as such.
Even if the parties' purposes are unexceptionable,
there must still be an inquiry into the probable state
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of competition if the collaboration is allowed. Such ers require a physician joint venture to restrucan inquiry begins with an estimate of both the par- ture itself in a way that sacrifices available effities' market power - their ability to affect mar- ciencies, they should have substantial reasons
ket price and overall output by their collaborative to fear that the arrangement jeopardizes comdecisions. If the parties turn out to possess market petition in the market as a whole. For reasons
power in fact, even though they do not need such similar to those already discussed, an agency
power to accomplish their ostensible should not, without at least a quick look power
procompetitive purpose, the net effect of their col- analysis, invoke the less-restrictive-alternative
laboration could easily be more harmful than ben- requirement to force the joint venturers to meet
eficial to consumers.
its prescriptions regarding risk-sharing or the
A case can frequently be resolved with- nature and extent of their integration. It is not
out finally balancing procompetitive against enough to say, as the Maricopa Court did, that
anticompetitive effects simply by asking whether "it is not necessary that the doctors do the price
the parties could achieve their legitimate pur- fixing. ' 39 Even though an enforcement agency
poses in a manner less dangerous to competi- can imagine less restrictive methods by which
tion. If such a "less restrictive alternative" was the doctors could market themselves, it should
available and was not adopted by the collabora- not require use of such methods unless to do so
tors, the antitrust enforcers might conclude ei- would avert an unreasonable threat to competither that their purpose was actually tion in the larger market.
anticompetitive, thus justifying application of the
Reflecting the demands of antitrust auper se rule, or that, despite their lawful purpose, thorities, the current practice in forming physithe parties' choice of the more restrictive method cian-sponsored networks is to design arrangeof achieving it can itself be penalized. In re- ments that avoid the noncompetitive fixing of
viewing physician-sponsored networks possess- prices for the services of the individual physiing a degree of market power, therefore, anti- cians in the group. Lawyers for physician JSAs
trust agencies must determine whether the have developed so-called "messenger" models
anticompetitive features of the arrangement are in an effort to obtain some of the efficiencies of
reasonable in the sense that they are well-tailored joint marketing while preserving a semblance of
to achieve their procompetitive purposes with price competition. 4 Indeed, the apparent freminimal harm to competition.
quency with which networks are formed using
Because the less-restrictive-alternative some kind of messenger mechanism demonrequirement is an element of a rule of reason, it strates that physicians set up JSAs primarily to
should not be used by the antitrust agencies sim- achieve efficiencies, not to fix prices. It is not
ply as a warrant for closely second-guessing the obvious why antitrust policy requires that they
way the parties have chosen to structure their re- adopt cumbersome marketing methods that purlationship. The less restrictive alternative should chasers themselves do not insist upon. The enbe invoked only if the methods chosen betray an forcement agencies have uncharacteristically exanticompetitive motive or materially increase the alted form over substance in their analysis, igthreat to competition. Before antitrust enforc- noring valid efficiency considerations that nor1995-1996
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mally would be given weight.
mum precautions (at whatever cost in inconveMessenger arrangements do not so obvi- nience to both doctors and purchasers) to elimiously qualify as less restrictive alternatives that nate all price-fixing features. Although it is hard
every physician-sponsored JSA should be re- to judge the relative efficiency of all the possible
quired to use them. To be sure, they are theo- messenger arrangements, the antitrust agencies
reticallyless restrictive than letting the joint ven- might somewhat improve the situation by tolerturers agree on price. But because they are cum- ating modified versions whenever competition
bersome to operate, they are not equally satis- in the market as a whole is not specifically in
factory as alternatives for getting the marketing danger.4 The better approach, however, would
job done. Their use therefore sacrifices some of be to apply the rule of reason.
Insistence on a second-best alternative is
the efficiency that JSAs can otherwise create.
Indeed, antitrust auappropriate in antitrust enforcement
thorities apparently Insistence on a second-best
F
and under the rule of
insist that physician
JSAs employ a par- alternative is a] ipropriate in
reason only if a specific risk to competicularly cumbertition outweighs the
antitrust enforc ement and
some mechanism

called the "pure"

f reason only
under the rule 1C
C
if a specific risi to competition

messenger model.
Under these arrangements, the marketing
outweighs the
agent must communicate offers back forgone.
and forth between
bulk purchasers and
individual doctors without disclosing to the latter the price terms that others are quoting. Because the pure messenger model is unwieldy,
some networks employ "modified" messenger arrangements, which may take the form of a standing offer of individual physicians' services on
uniform terms that a purchaser is free to accept
or reject. Such arrangements have never been
approved by enforcement officials, however, and
have sometimes been rejected. Thus, if a physician-sponsored network provides neither for risk
sharing nor for enough integration to create a
"new product," the antitrust authorities will apparently deem it unlawful unless it takes maxi88 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

,fficiencies

efficiencies forgone.
To be sure, use of a

messenger model
should be required
in many circum-

stances, often identifiable with only a
"quick look." But in
instances where the danger of anticompetitive
harm is unclear, a more extensive evaluation is
required. Such an analysis would consider such
factors as sponsorship of the JSA by physicians
in an aggressive competitive posture rather than
in a defensive, anticompetitive one (that is, by
interests other than a local medical society); the
percentage of competing physicians engaged in
the effort; their freedom to participate in competing ventures; their actual participation in other
marketing schemes; the sophistication, effectiveness, and preferences of the purchasers with
which they deal, and the overall vigor of competition in the market being served. Even if a net-
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work was the exclusive marketer for its member
doctors, there would still be no threat to competition if the market featured a variety of other
plans. In such a mature market, purchasers can
decide for themselves whether to patronize JSAs
in which physicians have not expressly undertaken to share financial risk, to integrate their
practices, or to maintain any kind of independent pricing. Indeed, the availability of meaningful purchaser options itself puts the collaborating physicians at risk of contract nonrenewal
and should go far toward satisfying government
officials that competition is not in danger.42
The danger of prejudging market
outcomes
The hostility of the antitrust agencies to
physician network joint ventures results in part
from their looking backward to the time when it
was reasonable to presume that physicians collaborated only for anticompetitive purposes.
Like many a wayward golf shot, however, the
current enforcement policy suffers also from
looking ahead, away from the object at hand and
toward an intended goal. Thus, the agencies appear to be anticipating where they think the health
care marketplace is headed and attempting to
steer physician-sponsored networks in that foreordained direction. Therefore, their prescription
of the form that such networks must take reflects
a prejudgment of the way physician services
should, and will eventually, be bought and sold
in the future health care marketplace. In writing
such a prescription, however, the agencies run
the risk of choking off (in Professor Sullivan's
words) "the market's manner of striving for efficiency."
The antitrust agencies are not alone in
assuming that all health care will eventually be
1995-1996

provided by integrated health plans.43 Many
other observers also believe that physicians must
bear financial risk if they are to be induced to
provide health care efficiently and without the
chronic excesses that have characterized much
fee-for-service medicine. However, it is dangerous for regulators to dictate market outcomes on
the basis of a prioriassumptions about what is
and what is not efficient or responsive to the
needs and preferences of purchasers.' Current
antitrust enforcement policy with respect to physician networks is an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion that, in attempting to provide guidance
to the industry, has become overly regulatory and
prescriptive, foreclosing options that might attract followers in a competitive market.
The American Medical Association
("AMA"), in advocating greater freedom for physicians to create their own networks, has been
somewhat careful about challenging directly the
conventional view that physicians will ultimately
either be put under managed-care arrangements
operated by third parties or be organized in competing groups with explicit individual or collective incentives to control costs. Thus, AMA officials have sought to persuade antitrust enforcers that physicians need more freedom to collaborate only so that they can take incremental
steps toward fuller integration or can explore new
methods of payment without having to take the
plunge all at once.45 Citing physicians' lack of
capital, experience, and management skills necessary to organize a fully integrated plan, the
AMA group argues that physicians need an opportunity to test the waters and to evolve gradually toward full-blown integration of their practices. Observing that simple networks and management service organizations ("MSOs") could
either serve as building blocks for larger plans
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to incorporate in their systems or evolve into
physician-sponsored entities capable of bearing
financial risks or offering "new products," it advocates antitrust relief that would facilitate physician experimentation with new ways of organizing themselves. This article argues more explicitly than does the AMA that some JSAs may
have immediate procompetitive value in their
own right and should therefore survive antitrust
scrutiny without regard to the speculative, though
probably valid, claim that they are also valuable
as half-way houses on the way to fuller integration. Whereas the AMA hopes for some legislative relaxation of antitrust requirements, agency
application of the rule of reason would alone be
enough to give physicians all the freedom of action that is compatible with effective competition.
The AMA has also argued that impeding
the creation of doctor-controlled plans fosters the
unnatural growth of health plans operated by
large corporate sponsors, which it alleges are less
attuned than physician groups to patient welfare
and the quality of care. Although granting legislative relief to physician collaboration would be
a serious policy error,' antitrust enforcers should
not, without good reason, deny physician-designed arrangements a fair chance to compete
against lay-controlled entities in finding efficient
ways to cope with disease at reasonable cost. In
competitive markets, some such plans might
prove attractive to many consumers. Able to rely
on professionalism, collegiality, and consensus
rather than exclusively on rules and regulations
imposed from the corporate top down, physiciansponsored plans should have a comparative advantage in finding and implementing cost-saving methods that maintain essential quality and
preserve intangible values that are at risk in many
90 o Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

of today's managed-care systems. 47
In any event, putting doctors at financial
risk in treating their patients is not so obviously
a wise and prudent policy that all physician-sponsored health plans should be forced into that
mold. Financial risk creates interest conflicts,
diminishes loyalty to patients, and may undermine professionalism, with consequences that
some consumers would find objectionable. Not
only do the incentives employed in many integrated plans engender sub rosa rationing of care
that consumers have no way to monitor, but consumers and their agents lack other kinds of reliable information permitting them to compare the
overall performance of competing plans. Thus,
they have much to worry about in purchasing
health care today and might therefore feel safer
in dealing with plans that did not put physicians
at financial risk.' Physician-sponsored JSAs, if
they do not dominate their local market, might
add usefully to the competitive mix precisely
because they do not feature direct financial incentives to withhold care, corporate control of
medical practice, or integration and income pooling that lessen productivity incentives. A marketplace lacking arrangements designed by physicians themselves (not by antitrust authorities)
could easily fail to serve consumers well or to
be fully reliable, from the standpoint of society
as a whole, as a place for working out the difficult trade-offs with which health care necessarily abounds.
One consequence of the current and
emerging problems with managed care could be
a rising tide of regulation. Already, a combination of physician criticism, rumor, unverified consumer complaints, and occasional press reports
of beneficial care denied is causing increasing
skepticism and critical comment about the new
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generation of health plans. This discontent could insurance regulators. State insurance regulation
easily ripen into a further backlash of regulation would increase the difficulty of creating new netand litigation. Although designed to protect con- work joint ventures, would raise their costs, and
sumers, such legal developments would raise would limit their ability to meet purchaser needs
health plan costs and limit the ability of plans to and expectations, thus undermining the efficienadopt innovations responsive to the wishes of cies that such networks might otherwise achieve.
consumers and their agents. Indeed, overregula- Physician JSAs, on the other hand, would escape
tion is already a problem in many states, and only such regulation and would thus greatly enhance
the fortuitous presence of the federal Employee the freedom of self-insured employers and other
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") as purchasers to obtain the services they require
a barrier to intrusive state regulation and judi- without encountering the delays, obstacles, and
cial oversight of employee benefit plans 49 has per- costs that state regulators impose.
mitted the market to
The asmake
as much
sumption that comprogress as it has to- ERISA is under constant
petition will evenward bringing costs
tually induce virtuchallenge,
however,
and
may
under appropriate
ally all Americans
control. ERISA is eventually give way as a
to enroll in some
under constant chalform of managedlenge, however, and
defense against heavyhanded
care organization
may eventually give
fails to take account
state regulators.
way as a defense
of the fact that
against
heavynearly 100 million
Americans
are
currently
covered
by self-insured
handed state regulators. For federal antitrust authorities to mandate risk sharing that in turn in- ERISA plans. This is roughly twice the number
vites either relaxation of ERISA preemption or who receive their employer-purchased benefits
new state regulatory controls could be highly through entities that integrate financing and dedestructive of the market's ability to achieve ef- livery in ways that would satisfy the antitrust
ficiency.
authorities in a physician-controlled arrangeIn this connection, it should be noted that ment. There are some markets such as Califorthe National Association of Insurance Commis- nia where the market penetration by conventional
sioners has recently declared its members' in- HMOs and managed-care organizations is imtention to treat any network of physicians that pressive, but there are many others, for example,
contracts with an employer to assume any de- large parts of the Middle West, where competigree of financial risk as an insurer requiring state tion has operated for some time without induclicensure as such.' Thus, the antitrust require- ing employers to rely heavily on corporate
ment that physician-sponsored networks be struc- middlemen or integrated or risk-bearing physitured to impose financial risks on physicians is cian networks. In these markets, many large
driving such plans directly into the arms of state employers do not require either that physician
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networks assume financial risk or that physicians
integrate themselves in some formal fashion.
Instead, they have employed either in-house benefit managers or third-party administrators who
contract with physicians or physician networks
directly at negotiated prices and work with them,
often in highly creative ways, to control costs.
Such employers apparently prefer the cost savings achieved through careful selection of physicians and through cooperation with them in addressing cost problems over the savings they
might gain by contracting out the business on a
capitated basis. Antitrust enforcers should not
deny employers the option of dealing with physician JSAs, which they can hold responsible for
selecting physicians who provide appropriate
care without overcharging for their services.
Self-insured employers should therefore
be free to work directly with physician-designed
JSAs and not forced instead either to form their
own networks or to hire independent entities to
assume risk, to manage care, or to form fully integrated health plans. Such entities naturally expect to profit both from investing the employer's
advance payments and, most importantly, from
economizing on the provision of health care to
employees and their families. Many employers
might prefer to eliminate the middleman and to
take direct responsibility for both the cost and
the quality of medical care that their employees
receive. In this effort, physician networks organized by physicians themselves could be valuable allies. Antitrust enforcers are simply wrong
to insist that, when physicians organize a network joint venture, the only issue is whether the
sponsors have either preserved a semblance of
price competition among themselves or followed
the agencies' prescriptions in allocating risks or
integrating their practices. Ironically, the ques-
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tion they should ask is whether the market features other plans that meet the agencies' conditions. Once a market has matured to this extent,
purchasers should be allowed to choose for themselves how they want physicians to be organized
and compensated for their services.
An invitation for congressional
intervention?
Agency obtuseness on the issue addressed in this article comes at a particularly inopportune time; as Congress is considering major reforms of the Medicare program. The version of the reform legislation that passed the
House of Representatives in the Fall of 1995 included two provisions relating to antitrust law
applicable to physicians. One would have explicitly required application of the rule of reason
rather than a per se rule to "physician-sponsored
networks" ("PSNs") contracting with "physiciansponsored organizations" ("PSOs") to deliver
Medicare services under a PSO capitation contract with the government." Thus, the House
bill opted for letting physicians deal with
"MedicarePlus" contractors through JSAs to the
same extent that, under the aforementioned
analysis, physicians could employ JSAs in dealing with ERISA plans and other private or public purchasers. The need for the House provision would therefore be obviated if the antitrust
agencies were to relax the policy criticized in
this article. Indeed, that outcome would be highly
preferable to a legislative fix precisely because
it would extend to physician networks of all
kinds, not just to those organized to serve Medicare beneficiaries. In addition, it is always preferable to solve problems in the administration of
antitrust law by refining doctrine so that it better
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promotes competition rather than by turning to
Congress.
A more troubling provision in the House
bill would have created a sweeping antitrust exemption for so-called "medical self-regulatory
entities,"52 rolling back twenty years of painstaking development (since Goldfarb) of antitrust
principles applicable to concerted action by professional groups. Physician interests have long
contended that antitrust enforcers misconstrue
their motives in taking collective action in the
marketplace. The agencies have successfully
maintained, however, that the law requires the
uncompromising maintenance of competition in
professional fields, even when professionals can
plausibly claim that their anticompetitive actions
are motivated by concern for the public interest.53 Thus, the antitrust movement has successfully brought to bear in medicine the wholesomely objective principle that parties with a
conflict of interests ought never to exercise coercive powers that are subject to anticompetitive
abuse. A concept that the House bill would have
converted to an impractical, and much too forgiving, subjective test. Experience under the
antitrust laws since the 1970s has generally vindicated the premise that competitive markets are
preferable to professional control precisely because they are more hospitable to innovations
responsive to consumer interests.
Unfortunately, unwise administration of
the antitrust laws, either by the agencies or by
the courts, invites Congress to intervene on behalf of politically powerful physician interests
and to enact confusing, possibly over broad
correctives or destructive immunities like the
ones in H.R. 2425.-4 The agency policy discussed
is thus doubly unwise. In addition to being wrong
as a matter of antitrust doctrine, it may prove a
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political disaster. Precisely because it has been
based more on hostility toward physicians and
suspicions about their motives than on reasoned
application of antitrust policy, it has given medical interests a wedge with which to get Congress
into the act, creating the potential for legislation
virtually repealing antitrust law as it affects organized medicine. Antitrust is ultimately a political enterprise on which turns the fate of competition in the economy as a whole.55 If competition is not to be undercut by congressional tinkering, antitrust enforcement must reflect astute
political judgment as well as sound legal and
economic analysis. An overly aggressive trustbusting mentality, such as the attitudes manifested by the agencies toward physician-sponsored JSAs, can easily have political repercussions harmful to competition in health care.
Conclusion
Americans are currently being denied access, ironically by antitrust authorities, to a variety of doctor-sponsored physician networks that
could perform useful services for some purchasers in some health care markets. In particular,
the current policy of antitrust enforcers, in requiring all such networks to meet certain organizational or financial requirements, neglects at
least three realities. First, self-insured ERISA
plans have very different needs than other purchasers of health care and physician networks
are capable of responding directly to these needs.
Second, the antitrust agencies fail to recognize
the heavy regulatory burdens and litigation
threats facing the kinds of health plans they visualize as the wave of the health care future; precisely because ERISA plans and physician JSAs
both escape many of these burdens, they may be
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jointly capable of efficiencies that are difficult whether specific physician joint ventures or joint
for other plans to achieve. Finally, the antitrust selling arrangements are more likely to suppress
agencies seem trapped in a time warp that keeps competition or to efficiently serve the needs of
them fearful of physician conspiracies that are both their members and sophisticated purchasmuch less likely to prosper, and thus less likely ers, especially large employers and their employees. The threat that current enforcement policy
to be attempted, today than in an earlier era.
The Sherman Act's rule of reason was poses to all physician network joint ventures that
designed specifically to ensure that antitrust au- fail to meet the agencies' own prescriptions
thorities consult the realities of actual markets should be removed, either by a new policy statein making judgments about whether competition ment or by an official clarification prominently
is in jeopardy or is operating in healthy though announced. It would be a terrible reflection on
possibly unpredictable ways. Conscientious an- the performance of the antitrust agencies if Contitrust analysis should enable the DOJ and FTC gress had to put them on the correct doctrinal
to recognize, often with only a "quick look," path in evaluating physician networks.
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readily, without even a quick look that would probably have
changed the outcome in one case but not the other. See FTC
v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990)
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as a per se violation without regard to its plausible business
purpose).
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for this reason, courts have been "slow to condemn rules
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FFC v. Indiana Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986). In
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appeal to Congress for antitrust relief. See infra text accompanying notes 50-54.
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that a network include any physician willing and able to meet
its terms, would diminish the risk of deselection. In states
where such inclusiveness is mandated by law, the antitrust
agencies could reasonably take the position that any joint venture should satisfy their requirements with respect to risk sharing or integration.

253, 263 (1963)).
32

Id. at 21-22.
33
Id. at 22.
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and engaged in suspiciously parallel conduct. The private
plaintiff, however, for reasons of its own, did not seek such
relief, asking only for the invalidation of blanket licenses
(which served the interests of its competitors more than its
own) and not for the restoration of unbridled competition
(which would have benefitted its competitors more than itself). See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 16-18 (discussing
CBS's theory and desired remedy).
" Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23 ("The individual composers
and authors have [not] agreed not to sell individually in any
other market .... ).
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concerning the compatibility of a JSA with competition in
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periodic "profiling" of their practice patterns. Although the
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other hand, a state "any-willing-provider" law, mandating

96 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

43

See, e.g., Greaney, supra note 8.
Although it is often assumed that fee-for-service practice is
inherently inefficient, physician practice styles may be changing as physicians become more accountable for their competitive performance (see supra note 41), as cost-consciousness becomes pervasive, and as changes in the prevailing standard of care reduce legal pressures to over treat patients. Indeed, efficient practices have often been observed in some
multi specialty groups treating patients under traditional indemnity insurance. See also Jeff C. Goldsmith, The Illusive
Logic of Integration, HEALTHCARE FORUM J. 26 (Sept.-Oct.
1994) (questioning the presumed benefits of much of the organizational integration sweeping the health care industry).
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that doctors must have a larger role in decision making and
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Best Interests?, HEALTH AFFAIRS 185 (1994).
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See, e.g., FFC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986);
Nat'l. Soc. of Prof. Eng. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
But see supra note 20.
Congress last modified the application of antitrust law to the
health care industry (also at the behest of organized medicine) in the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.
42 U.S.C. § 11101-51 (1988 & Supp.). Because courts had
been unable to find in the antitrust doctrine any reasonable
and expeditious basis for distinguishing between meritorious
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and nonmeritorious private antitrust challenges to staff privileges decisions in hospitals, see, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486
U.S. 94 (1988), Congress felt compelled to provide qualified
antitrust immunity for hospital-based peer-review (and other
similar professional) activities. On the other hand, if courts
(perhaps with wise and balanced guidance from the antitrust
agencies) had focused their efforts on distinguishing between
actions of hospitals themselves and actions of medical staffs
empowered by hospitals finally to decide the fate of their competitors, there would probably have been no need for congressional intervention. See Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors
and Hospitals:An Antitrust Perspectiveon Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE L. J. 1071, 1108-42 (1984).
"See supra note 20-21.
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